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 *E.I.P.R. 565  In a much awaited decision, the Court of Justice held that the 
functionalities of a computer program, including data files and programming languages, 
generally cannot be protected by copyright. Interfaces can be protected only the extent 
that they represent the author's creative choices. The court's decision on arti.5(3) of the 
software directive is more cryptic but probably can be interpreted to mean that the owner 
of the copyright in a computer program may not prevent a licensee from determining the 
ideas and principles which underlie the elements of the program so long as the user does 
not infringe the copyright owner's exclusive rights. 
 Introduction  
When computer programs entered the House of Copyright in the 1980s--a movement that 
peaked with the recognition of programs as literary works in a 1991 European Directive 
followed at the international level by the 1994 TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty1 --something fundamental changed in copyright law because subject-matter not 
designed to communicate ideas between or among human beings was protected by a form 
of intellectual property protection (copyright) initially established to protect markets and 
provide incentives for authors and publishers of books. By this, we do not mean that the 
ideas had to be “artistic” in nature. Indeed, maps, charts and other technical 
subject-matter (including designs in a number of countries) can be protected as copyright 
works. We mean that computer programs are not primarily designed to communicate; they 
are machine processes designed to make devices (computers, etc.) perform certain 
tasks.2 This was seen as potentially debasing or at least radically transforming copyright 
law and policy, bearing in mind that the software industry dwarfs all other copyright 
industries combined.3 
The tragedy has mostly been avoided, in large part because courts have stuck to copyright 
principles and history and refused to transform copyright's fundamental underpinnings to 
fit the needs of software.4 We see an excellent example of this in the decision of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice) in SAS Institute Inc v World 
Programming Ltd released on May 2, 2012.5 
The case stemmed from a reference by the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice 
of England and Wales, which was trying to determine whether, under the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988,6 a defendant was liable for copyright infringement if, by 
observing a competitor's program (acquired under a “click-through” online licence), it 
could produce a program performing similar functions. A thorough analysis of Arnold J.'s 
opinion and of the facts of the case was published in an earlier issue of E.I.P.R.7 
 *E.I.P.R. 566  Questions before the court  
Basically, the nine questions referred to the Court of Justice by the High Court boiled down 
to three and were treated as such (that is, answered in three groupings) by the court. 
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• does the functionality of a computer program, the programming language and the format 
of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions 
constitute a form of expression of that program that is protected by copyright (questions 
1-5); 
• can a person who has obtained a copy of a computer program under a licence, without the 
authorisation of the owner of the copyright in that program, observe, study or test the 
functioning of that program in order to determine the ideas and principles which underlie 
any element of the program, if that person carries out acts covered by that licence with a 
purpose that goes beyond the framework established by the licence? (questions 6 and 7); 
• is the reproduction, in a computer program or a user manual for that program, of certain 
elements described in the user manual for another computer program protected by 
copyright an infringement of that right in the latter manual? (questions 8 and 9). 
 The exclusion of ideas  
The court relied on the nuanced Opinion of Advocate General Bot,8 who had found that 
copyright protection did not extend to the functionalities of the program.9 In particular, 
A.G. Bot had noted that the 
“The protection of a computer program is not therefore confined to the literal elements of 
that program, that is to say, the source code and the object code, but extends to any other 
element expressing the creativity of its author.”10 
This rule is incorporated in international instruments. The background history of art.9.2 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, which states that “copyright protection shall extend to expressions 
and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such”, 
was a Japanese text that would have specifically excluded algorithms.11 There is at least 
implicit recognition that computer programs are different. Ontologically, first, because they 
are machine processes; but also economically, because protecting them would produce 
anti-competitive effects and other inefficient outcomes. As the Court of Justice and the A.G. 
noted, “to accept that the functionality of a computer program can be protected by 
copyright would amount to making it possible to monopolize ideas, to the detriment of 
technological processes and industrial development”.12 The TRIPS negotiators' choice to 
avoid a specific mention of algorithms and to replace it with language borrowed from 
s.102(b) of the US Copyright Act,13 was seen as a safer alternative. Recital 14 of the 
Computer Programs Directive was more specific in categorising “logic, algorithms and 
programming languages” as potential (unprotectable) ideas.14 
The court got it right in finding that: 
• copyright protection extends to both source and object code, a matter also recognised in 
art.10.1 of the TRIPS Agreement15 ; 
• neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the 
format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions 
constitutes a form of expression of that program16 ; 
• however, if one were “to procure the part of the source code or the object code relating 
to the programming language or to the format of data files used in a computer program, 
and if that party were to create, with the aid of that code, similar elements in its own 
computer program, that conduct would be liable to constitute partial reproduction”.17 
 *E.I.P.R. 567  The Court of Justice's decision follows a most interesting discussion of this 
issue in international, EU and domestic law by Arnold J.18 Reviewing the leading UK cases 
on the protection of non-literal elements,19 he concluded that the TRIPS exclusion of ideas 
from the scope of protection of copyright may have changed UK law.20 He (rightly in our 
view) noted the need to interpret EU law in a manner consonant with TRIPS.21 He then 
concluded, in a finding that in our view remains intact following the Court of Justice's 
decision, that: 
“[C]opyright in a literary work is the form of expression of the literary work itself. Other 
things that are conveyed by or described in the literary work, of which ‘ideas, procedures, 
methods of operation and mathematical concept’ is evidently a non-exhaustive list, are not 
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protected. Thus these provisions draw a line between copyright protection and the public 
domain.”22 
We might have a small quibble with his last point on this subject. Discussing the parties' 
arguments with respect to the words “as such” at the end of TRIPS art.9.2, Arnold J. noted 
that: 
“[T]he distinction is one between different kinds of skill, judgement and labour. Skill, 
judgement and labour in devising ideas, procedures, methods of operation and 
mathematical concepts is not protected by the copyright in a literary work. What is 
protected by copyright in a literary work is the skill, judgement and labour in devising the 
form of expression of the literary work.”23 
We are not convinced that this is the best way to parse the distinction. It may be difficult or 
indeed impossible to draw the distinction between the types of “skill, labour and judgment” 
that gave a work its originality. It may be more appropriate to say that the creative choices 
that generated such originality are what copyright protects, but only up to a certain level of 
abstraction (where expression becomes idea). This approach, namely looking for 
originality, also excludes pedestrian or otherwise non-original elements which are present 
in the work (mere ideas; parts of the work dictated by function or tools used or applicable 
standards). 
 Copyright protects intellectual creations  
A major reason for the exclusion of data formats and files from the scope of copyright is the 
reference to “intellectual creation” as the applicable benchmark. Here, the Court of 
Justice's opinion explicitly follows in the wake of Infopaq, Softwarová, FAPL, Painer and 
Football Dataco.24 
One of the authors of this article has argued for years that the notion of intellectual creation 
contained in the travaux préparatoires of the Berne Convention and reflected in several 
instances in the text of the Convention (especially art.2(5)) is linked to the creative choices 
made by an author, which one might define as choices not primarily dictated by the 
function of the work, the method or tools used or applicable standards.25 As a rule of 
thumb, creative choices are those that one can isolate by asking whether two authors in 
similar situations (tools, direction, budget, etc.) would likely have produced essentially the 
same thing. It is those choices that create protectable expression and that, at bottom, 
copyright is meant to incentivise and protect. The rule is somewhat different from the 
traditional skill, labour and judgment test, but the differences only affect a few mostly 
marginal cases.26 In the SAS case, one would have to find that the code (not formats or a 
language per se) which the Court of Justice found potentially protectable embodies such 
choices. 
The Court of Justice has now reiterated many times the need to show that such an 
intellectual creation is present to justify copyright protection.27 The opinion of the court in 
the SAS case stays the course: 
“It is only through the choice, sequence and combination of those words, figures or 
mathematical concepts that the author may express his creativity in an original manner 
and achieve a result, namely the user manual for the computer program, which is an 
intellectual creation.”28 
 *E.I.P.R. 568  The court then drew what seems an entirely appropriate conclusion from 
the previous observation, namely that: 
“[T]he reproduction… of certain elements described in the user manual for another 
computer program protected by copyright is capable of constituting an infringement of the 
copyright in the latter manual if … that reproduction constitutes the expression of the 
intellectual creation of the author of the user manual for the computer program protected 
by copyright.”29 
 Application to data formats and other interfaces  
While the copyright protection of computer code (source or object) is easily understood for 
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slavish copying of all or a substantial part of a program, it is still difficult to draw an 
appropriate line where more than the algorithm but less than the actual code is taken. In 
certain cases, a proper determination can be made on the basis of the need to allow 
interoperability (and hence competition). This is the level of abstraction issue mentioned 
above. 
That said, the exclusion of data formats seems correct as a matter of copyright theory. 
Samuelson, Vinje and Cornish published a comment on the case after the release of A.G. 
Bot's Opinion30 with which we largely agree. As we understand their comment, they would 
exclude data formats from copyright protection because computer program do not contain 
data formats, they only process them. One might question whether it is always false to 
state that a computer program contains data formats (which would be subject to the usual 
rules to decide whether copyright protection applies) and that programs are only able to 
process such formats. A data format is prescribed by and as such may be reflected and, 
arguably at least, “contained”, in a program. 
Beyond the semantic debate, we believe, however, that their suggestion is correct as a 
matter of policy. In keeping with the Directive's balance of protection and competition, 
data formats should not be protected whether or not one sees them as per se excluded 
from copyrightable subject-matter. Before explaining why even data formats that might 
seem as prima facie protectable by copyright should not be protected, let us note that we 
also agree with Samuelson, Vinje and Cornish that appropriate distinctions must be drawn 
between types of interfaces--in other words, conclusions one might draw with respect to 
data formats need not apply to other types of interfaces.31 For example, an audiovisual 
user interface may well be protected by copyright as a separate audiovisual work, as was 
clearly stated in the Softwarová case.32 Copying it, as would copying the code that makes 
it possible, could both be pursued as separate instances of copyright infringement. The 
Court of Justice had already held in the Softwarová case that when deciding whether a 
graphical user interface is original, the originality criterion cannot be met for the 
components of the interface which are solely characterised by their technical function.33 It 
went even further, even though it did it clumsily,34 and adopted the merger doctrine. It 
held that: 
“[W]here the expression of those components is dictated by their technical function, the 
criterion of originality is not met, since the different methods of implementing an idea are 
so limited that the idea and the expression become indissociable.35 ” 
As we see it, the matter is not binary in the sense that we do not believe that an interface 
is necessarily either expressive (protected) or functional/behaviour of the program 
(unprotected). This might best be seen instead as a continuum, with some interfaces being 
almost completely at one or the other of the scale, but others falling somewhere along the 
axis (say, 60 per cent expressive; 40 per cent functional). In effect, the question of the 
copyright protection of interfaces was hotly debated during the drafting of the directive and 
a middle-ground solution was in the end, adopted.36 A court may then decide to either 
limit infringement to expressive elements if they can be separated from the functional; or 
it may refuse a finding of infringement if it would amount to protecting the functional 
elements, as the Court of Justice noted in the SAS case. 
This is how we would interpret the Court's proviso that: 
“[T]he present judgment cannot affect the possibility that the SAS language and the format 
of SAS Institute's data files might be protected, as works, by copyright under Directive 
2001/29 if they are their author's own intellectual creation.”37 
On data formats, we believe that the explanation above would exclude all or almost all from 
any copyright infringement claim (we discuss the fate of programming languages below). 
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice's statements at [39] and [45] are facially hard to 
reconcile. On the one hand, the court says clearly that “[n]either the functionality of a 
computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a 
computer program in *E.I.P.R. 569  order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a 
form of expression of that program for the purposes of Article 1(2) of Directive” and further 
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that “to accept that the functionality of a computer program can be protected by copyright 
would amount to making it possible to monopolise ideas, to the detriment of technological 
progress and industrial development”.38 On the other hand, it says that “the SAS language 
and the format of SAS's data files might be protected, as works, by copyright under 
Directive 2001/29 if they are their author's own intellectual creation”.39 How can the court 
say that functionality, e.g. language and format of data files, is not a form of expression 
and then say that data formats or a language can be protected as a work if they are their 
author's own intellectual creation? Ideas, even “original” ones, are not protectable by 
copyright. This is why we think that data formats and languages should not be protected by 
copyright. 
One way to reconcile the two paragraphs is to say that the intellectual creation test applies 
to data formats and languages as to any other potential work. However, because they are 
functional, and may be considered ideas, not expressions, data formats and the SAS 
language are not protected. Another way to reconcile the above statements is to say that 
the Court of Justice meant that the actual code underlying the language and data formats 
(in which the language and data formats are written) can be protected, as reflected in [43]: 
“[I]f a third party were to procure the part of the source code or the object code relating to 
the programming language or to the format of data files used in a computer program, and 
if that party were to create, with the aid of that code, similar elements in its own computer 
program, that conduct would be liable to constitute partial reproduction.” 
There is no doubt that computer code is protectable if it embodies an author's creative 
choices. This is difficult to apply in the case of the SAS language, however, because the 
“language” is hard to separate from the source code.40 Additionally, one would have to 
identify whose choices, if any, are embodied in the code (some might be the client's). 
Finally, the code must be analysed to see if it embodies original expression and if then to 
ensure there is no merger between idea and expression. 
 Protecting programming languages  
The court's reference to the possibility that a programming language41 might be protected 
(subject to the intellectual creation test) raises additional normative issues. SAS claimed 
copyright rights on what it referred to as its programming “language”. This would grant 
SAS an exclusive right on certain building blocks of expression. As Samuelson, Vinje and 
Cornish suggest: 
“[T]he policy reasons for treating a putative language as outside the scope of copyright 
protection outweigh the policy reasons that would favour treating it as protectable 
expression. If the former outweigh the latter because free use of a programming language 
is needed as a building block for constructing new programs, then the programming 
language should be among the ideas and principles that copyright does not protect in 
programs.”42 
Arnold J. arrived at a similar conclusion,43 as did Pumfrey J. in an earlier opinion by the 
same court.44 
The distinction is relatively clear. A sequence of words expressed (even if an in invented 
language such as in, say, Tolkien's Lord of the Rings ) is protectable expression. However, 
linguistics rules (syntax, semantics) are ideas. Likewise, individual words are not 
themselves protected, which would seem to exclude a new vocabulary as a work in itself. 
In Infopaq, the Court of Justice had said that for copyright to subsist in a literary work, 
there needs to be a combination of words so that a single word could not obtain copyright 
(at [45] and [46]).45 It would have been ideal if the court had repeated the substance of 
these two paragraphs at that particular point in the SAS case. On the face of [45] of the 
SAS decision, it is not at all clear (and national courts should not easily infer) that a 
language can be protected by copyright. Thankfully, the court stresses the point much 
more clearly at [66] and [67] of its SAS decision: 
“66. In the present case, the keywords, syntax, commands and combinations of 
commands, options, defaults and iterations consist of words, figures or mathematical 
concepts which, considered in isolation, are not, as such, an intellectual creation of the 
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author of the computer program. 
67. It is only through the choice, sequence and combination of those words, figures or 
mathematical concepts that the author may *E.I.P.R. 570  express his creativity in an 
original manner and achieve a result, namely the user manual for the computer program, 
which is an intellectual creation (see, to that effect, Infopaq International, paragraph 45).” 
While in those two paragraphs, it refers to [45] in Infopaq, it would have been clearer if it 
had also cited [46] in Infopaq to stress the point even more. The fact that it gives the user 
manual as an example of such literary work seems to rule out that a language as such could 
be protected by copyright. 
 Reproduction presupposes access  
The question of what amounts to a reproduction is rather interesting. It forces one to 
demarcate the copying of ideas, what one might call (allowed) inspiration, from 
reproduction of expressive elements, especially beyond the simple copying of literal 
elements. A.G. Bot referred to Infopaq's broad definition of “reproduction”, in keeping with 
Recital 21 of the Directive.46 
As noted above, copying implies access, leaving aside the issue of decompilation.47 It is 
similarly clear that a copyright infringing reproduction can only happen if what is copied is 
what is protected by copyright. Indeed, it is axiomatic in copyright law that copying 
presupposes access. To that extent, one cannot disagree with the court. 
When access is made possible by reverse engineering, however, a different set of rules 
might apply.48 The exact extent of the Directive's provision allowing decompilation (a form 
of reverse engineering) of object code but not “to be used for the development, production 
or marketing of a computer program substantially similar in its expression, or for any other 
act which infringes copyright”49 is seen as somehow broadening protection. 
Though this is a matter for a different article, it strikes us that this is not a foregone 
conclusion. Substantial similarity of expression (the terminology used in the Directive) is, 
after all, what copyright protects, and the Directive does refer to any other act that would 
infringe copyright.50 It could perhaps be better understood as saying that decompilation 
does not create an additional right of the user to recopy the code beyond the limited 
purposes contained in art.6 of the Directive.51 In the same copyright vein, the Directive 
draws a distinction between reverse engineering to understand the functionality (not 
copyright-protected) of a computer program, which it allows (art.5(3)), and decompilation 
of object code, which is only allowed to achieve interoperability, not to justify or excuse 
additional copying (art.6).52 The High Court also referred questions on this former 
possibility to reverse engineer the program, and we turn to this issue now. 
 Rights of a licensee  
The issue of whether contracts can limit recourse by a licensed user to statutory exceptions 
and limitations is not new.53 To a certain extent, it may depend on domestic contract law. 
The matter here is considered squarely under the terms of art.5(3), which provides that a 
licensee is entitled to observe, study or test the functioning of a computer program in order 
to determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program and 
art.9(1) which adds that any contractual provisions contrary to the exceptions provided for 
in arts 5(2), 5(3) and 6 of that directive are null and void. The question the court had to 
answer was whether the purpose of the study or observation of the functioning of the 
computer program has an effect on whether the person who has obtained the licence may 
invoke art.5(3). In short, the answer is yes. 
The court develops its reasoning as follows. It holds that the purpose of art.5(3) is “to 
ensure that the ideas and principles which underlie any element of a computer program are 
not protected by the owner of the copyright by means of a licensing agreement” and 
highlights that this article reflects art.1(2) which sets out the idea/expression 
dichotomy.54 It then reminds us of the content of arts 9(1) and 5(3).55 It draws from all 
these that “the determination of those ideas and principles may be carried out within the 
framework of the acts permitted by the licence”.56 This is reinforced by Recital 18, which 
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provides that a lawful user cannot be prevented from performing acts necessary to observe 
study or test the functioning of the program, provided that these acts do not infringe the 
copyright in the program, and Recital 17, according to which a contract may not prohibit 
the acts of loading ad running necessary for the intended purpose of the programme.57 
The court arrives at a dual conclusion: 
First: 
“[T]he owner of the copyright in a computer program may not prevent, by relying on the 
licensing agreement, the person who has obtained that licence from determining the ideas 
and principles which underlie all the elements of that program in the case *E.I.P.R. 
571  where that person carries out acts which that licence permits him to perform and the 
acts of loading and running necessary for the use of the computer program, and on 
condition that that person does not infringe the exclusive rights of the owner in that 
program.”58 
Secondly: 
“[C]opyright in a computer program cannot be infringed where … the lawful acquirer of the 
licence did not have access to the source code of the computer program to which that 
licence relates, but merely studied, observed and tested that program in order to 
reproduce its functionality in a second program.”59 
In the decision, the latter point qualifies the former and would thus seem to trump the 
former in the case of discrepancy. Can they be reconciled? Jointly, they could be read as 
stating that WPL did not infringe when it loaded a program (the copyright of which SAS 
licensed to them) in order to study, observe and test its behaviour, even if WPL's purpose 
was to make a functionally compatible program. Any provision in the licence agreement 
prohibiting this action on WPL's part would be null and void. The decompilation proviso to 
this rule, whatever its exact impact,60 would not apply as a factual matter here because 
WPL did not decompile. The court seems to have used the example of decompilation to 
contrast arts 5(3) and 6 and also because the High Court had addressed decompilation in 
its questions. 
However, the above approach--which we would suggest is the correct one--is not entirely 
clear from the Court of Justice's reasoning in [59]-[61]. The court discusses at length the 
purpose of the study or observation and stresses that it has to conform to the intended 
purpose of the program and cannot be done outside the framework of the licence. It notes 
that the national court had held that WPL did perform acts outside the scope of the 
licence.61 At [59], it then apparently sets out two cumulative conditions for art.5(3) to 
apply: (1) the licensee may only perform acts allowed by the licence and acts loading and 
running necessary to use the program, and (2) the licensee must not infringe the exclusive 
rights of the holder of the copyright in the program. However, in the end it concludes that 
WPL did not infringe (which is why we think the interpretation suggested in the previous 
paragraph is correct). 
Because WPL apparently did perform acts outside the scope of the licence, it seemingly 
does not fit within the two conditions set out by the Court of Justice. This is so unless what 
the court means in [61] only applies to the second condition and not the first. If one follows 
this interpretation, since the first condition is not met, WPL would infringe. If the decision 
is to be interpreted totally logically, WPL infringed as it did not fulfil the first condition of the 
test. This would be disturbing because it is difficult to reconcile how the court can, on the 
one hand, say that the purpose of art.5(3) is to ensure that any licensee can discover the 
ideas behind a program even if the licence agreement says otherwise and, on the other 
hand, say that the determination of the ideas must be done within the framework of the 
acts permitted by the licence. It would then be simple for a licensor to prevent such 
discovery in all cases via the licence agreement but this would be hard to reconcile 
(teleologically at least62 ) with the Directive. 
Perhaps the facts of the case explain the court's rather convoluted approach on this point. 
WPL purchased the (cheaper) learning edition of SAS. The licence stated that it was given 
only for “non-production” purposes. WPL could have purchased the “full edition” at a higher 
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price without the non-production purposes restriction. If this is what the court considered, 
the decision is problematic in cases where there is no choice as to the licence (only one 
contract is available to customers not several types with different types of clauses allowing 
different uses at different prices) and the licence states that the licensee may not use the 
program to discover the ideas behind it and/or make competing programs even if all the 
lawful user does is to observe, study and test the program without committing any act 
restricted by the directive. This interpretation, which we find difficult to accept or justify in 
light of the Directive, would basically allow a software company to create its own private 
(patent-like) protection through a contractual back door. As the court's interpretation of 
art.5(3) is unclear, one can surmise that national courts, even perhaps the High Court in 
this case, will refer further questions on it. In the meantime, hopefully courts will be 
hesitant to allow this type of contractual back door protection to interfere with fair 
competitive practices allowed (indeed encouraged) under the Directive. 
In the end, and for the judgment to make sense, we think that what the Court of Justice 
meant in effect in [59] and [61] is that a copyright holder cannot grant himself more rights 
than what the Computer Programs Directive grants him or her. In short, the right holder 
cannot by contract prevent a competitor from discovering the ideas and principles behind 
a program so long as the competitor does not infringe his or her exclusive rights. This 
would thus mean that WPL did not infringe based on the facts as reported. 
 *E.I.P.R. 572  Conclusion  
The functional behaviour of a computer program is not protected by copyright, as Arnold J. 
had noted in a conclusion now confirmed by the Court of Justice.63 There are good 
normative grounds to exclude much of the SAS claims. First and foremost, it would unduly 
limit competition, as the Court of Justice clearly underscored.64 WPL was essentially 
allowing SAS customers to interface with its own software by allowing them to reuse data 
(and related scripts or small programs generated by them) formatted per SAS's 
instructions, which SAS wanted to prevent because the need to reformat data for its 
customers would create significant switching costs.65 This type of de facto quasi-monopoly 
due to sunk cost investments is clearly not what copyright was designed to do. Quite the 
opposite: the Directive states that interoperability (a prerequisite of competition in this 
type of environment) is an exception (allowing decompilation of object code where 
necessary). 
SAS also clarifies the scope of protection by focusing on the notion of intellectual creation 
and the embedded notion of creative choices. This is what copyright as enshrined in the 
Berne Convention was and is about and it excludes functional elements from the scope of 
copyright protection. A careful analysis of the history and purpose of copyright suggests 
that this rule should not be fundamentally altered to protect functional aspects of software. 
However, the court's interpretation of art.5(3) of the Directive is difficult to decrypt and 
may be interpreted to imply that licensors can prevent the discovery of ideas and principles 
behind a computer program, a matter which in our view would contradict the Directive's 
purpose. However, we think that this cannot be what the court in all logic intended. It will 
be interesting to see what Arnold J. will decide in the case on remand. 
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 ___________________________________________________________________________  
1. The initial “copyright” dates back to the Statute of Anne. The Directive referred to here is Council Directive 
91/250 on the legal protection of computer programs [1991] OJ L122/42) (the Computer Programs 
Directive). It was codified in Directive 2009/24. The substance of the two directives is the same. Like the 
Court of Justice, we make reference solely to the original version of the directive. The TRIPS Agreement is 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994. The WIPO 
Copyright Treaty was signed on December 20, 1996. 
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